

# CONFIDENTIAL

MAJ William I. Howard	CPT Charles Griffin
MAJ Lonnie A. Singleton	CPT Bruce B. Green
CPT John N. Swift	CPT Charles R. McGregor
CPT Bernard J. Auor	MAJ Robert L. McKaig
MAJ George L. Doyle	MAJ Arthur R. Mahon
MAJ Stanley S. Dujak	LT Kenneth Mitchell
MAJ Douglas B. Brittain	MAJ Herman Musser
CPT Harold G. Brost	CPT Don L. Netzing
MAJ Charles P. Cabell	

g. The Division Chemical Section and 9th Chemical Detachment under the supervision of LTC Willis S. Rosing, Division Chemical Officer, continued to support division combat operations by performing tactical and bulk CS, personnel detector and defoliation missions in the division AOI. A total of 235,520 pounds of micropulverized CS powder was employed on known or suspected enemy infiltration routes, base camps and storage areas. 624 M7A3 CS grenades and 126 E153 CS Canister Clusters were employed in support of troops in contact and in conjunction with the newly developed MAIS (Mortar Aerial Delivery System). 279 flying hours were devoted to the conduct of personnel detector missions during the reporting period. A total of 13,400 gallons of herbicide was used, defoliating approximately 4,466 acres during the three month period. Defoliant was dispensed using the helicopter mounted sprayer and waterborne craft. Personnel Changes:

<u>Incoming Personnel</u>	<u>Assignments</u>
CPT Charles Shaw	CP, 9th Cml Det
CPT Ray Bills	Asst Div Cml Off
CPT Marion Cowan	1st Bde Cml Off
CPT Richard Saunders	2nd Bde Cml Off
CPT Robert Suchan	3rd Bde Cml Off
MSG Oswald Wethington	Cml Opns Sgt

CPT Allan E. Riley departed the 9th Cml Det on 14 January 1969 for re-assignment in CONUS. CPT James Dixon, 1st Bde Cml Off and CPT Richard Attanasio, 3d Bde Cml Off departed the 25th Infantry Division in December 1968.

h. Army Aviation Element (AAE). During this reporting period the AAE which monitored aviation support for the division functioned under the guidance of the DAO and under the direct staff supervision of the G3. During this period, Major Rice, was replaced by Major Teipel as ADAO. Key members of the AAE staff included, Lt Palmer, Lt Rath and CPT McMillen.

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During the period 1 Nov 68 to 31 Jan 1969, Army combat aviation support was provided by the 25th Aviation Battalion, D Troop, 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigade aviation sections, DivArty aviation section, and E Company, 725th Maintenance Battalion. Non-organic aviation support was furnished the Division by units of the Combat Aviation Group and 45th Medical Company. Troop lift and aerial resupply of ground combat units were furnished by non-organic units to include: 128th, 162nd and 173rd AHC, and the 213th ASHC of the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion. The 116th, 187th AHC's and 242nd ASHC of the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion. Non-organic aviation units flew 61,899 sorties in support of the Division. These tactical operations included 19,952 hours of flight time, 209,420 tons of cargo as well as 138,051 Pax transported. Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance missions were flown throughout the TAOI by organic aviation units and non-organic aviation units consisting of: C Troop 3-17 Cavalry Squadron, 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (Mohawk), 74th and 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies (Bird dog) all of which are members of the 12th Combat Aviation Group.

i. The Division Engineer section, under General Staff supervision, ACoFS, GS, coordinated engineer support for the division. The Division Engineer through 27 November was LTC J. W. Atwell with LTC Edward C. Gibson assuming command of the 65th Engineer Bn on 8 Dec 1968. MAJ J. W. Argo was interim Division Engineer. The Assistant Division Engineer was MAJ John E. Pearson through 19 December while the present ADE, CPT Jude W. Patin took over on 14 January 1969. CPT Richard R. Sonstélie served as ADE during the 19 December - 14 January period.

The November - January period saw several outstanding projects by the 65th Engineer Bn. Twenty-six hours after saboteurs blew the Phu Cuong Bridge, engineers under the direction of the 65th Engineer Bn put up a 708 ft M4T6 float bridge to pass the vital resupply convoy. The completion of the Go Dau Ha Bridge opened this market-place to 30,000 Vietnamese on the west bank of the Vam Co Dong. Another significant group of combat engineer projects was the opening of roads many of which had been closed for many years. including routes 7A, 249 and 62.

The 554th and 588th Engr Bns continued to provide both organic local and construction support to the 25th Infantry Division. The 554th paved a significant portion of the MSR during this period as well as paving on Cu Chi base camp. Many major construction tasks were completed at Cu Chi by the 554th Engrs and at Dau Tieng and Tay Ninh by the 588th Engrs. The 588th Engrs also provided combat support in the opening and repair of fire support bases in the Tay Ninh areas.

Land Clearing support was provided in November and December by the 2nd Platoon, 168th Land Clearing Team and in January by the 501st Land Clearing Team which cleared over 13,000 acres in that month along.

The Phu Cuong Bridge was reopened on 25 January 1969 through the efforts of the 41st Port Construction Company which was one of many 20th Engineer units which worked in the 25th Division TAOI during the period.

j. The Fire Support Element worked under the general staff supervision of the ACoFS, G3. The Division Artillery Commander, Colonel L. G. Hill, supervised the FSE as Division Fire Support Coordinator. He was assisted by LTC J. W. Dawson, AFSCORD, MAJ J. W. Church, CPT G. Clyde and six

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enlisted men. The FSE coordinated the fire support for the maneuver elements of the division. During the latter part of the reporting period, there was evidence that closer coordination was needed and studies were underway to determine the extent coordination and control were to be increased. The FSE also supervised the Artillery Warning Control Centers.

Each maneuver brigade was provided direct support by a light artillery battalion. Although there were some attachments and detachments, normally support was provided as follows:

<u>BRIGADE</u>	<u>DS BATTALIONS</u>
1st Brigade	7th Bn, 11th Artillery B Btry, 2d Bn, 77th Arty attached
2d Brigade	1st Bn, 8th Artillery
3d Brigade	2d Bn (-), 77th Artillery

The 3d Battalion (155mm/8"), 13th Artillery provided general support for the division. However, due to the lack of artillery to adequately cover portions of the 2d Brigade TAOI, 155mm batteries were occasionally assigned a DS mission. A 155mm battery was also assigned a DS mission to support the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry operating under division control.

During the previous reporting period the combat operations in the division area necessitated frequent moves of artillery units. During this reporting period there were few battery moves. The artillery was disposed throughout the division area in sixteen fire support bases, and most operations could be adequately supported without moving artillery. Within the TAOI, moves were made as follows:

	<u>Div Arty</u>	<u>FF Arty</u>
From prepared to unprepared position	24	1
Into base camp or prepared position	21	5
Replace battery in a prepared position	3	6
From prepared to unprepared position and return to prepared position	65	4
Into TAOI	-	2
Depart TAOI	-	3
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total moves	113	21

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US Navy operations on the Vam Co Dong River established new requirements for fire support and fire support coordination. In order to provide artillery support for the Elverine Force, the Division Artillery and gunship support on request.

During this period, new procedures were established to safeguard tactical reconnaissance aircraft from artillery fires. These procedures allow the ground commander concerned to determine if artillery fire will be suspended while reconnaissance aircraft are in his area. This additional coordination initially appears to be resulting in fewer aborts of reconnaissance missions and a greater degree of safety to aircraft flying the missions.

Ammunition expenditures were relatively high during this reporting period. The object of tactical operations was to find the enemy and destroy him with heavy volumes of fire and to reduce casualties by reducing close contact with enemy forces. Expenditures of artillery ammunition by the Division Artillery were:

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>NOVEMBER</u>	<u>DECEMBER</u>	<u>JANUARY</u>
105mm			
Total Rds	68,676	89,998	98,356
Rd/tube/day	42	56	59
155mm			
Total Rds	13,828	23,652	21,940
Rd/tube/day	25	44	39
8-inch			
Total Rds	2,263	3,751	2,517
Rd/tube/day	18	31	20

k. The Division Signal Officer under the direction of LTC John W. Sorbet, Division Signal Officer, and the general staff supervision of the AGofS, G3 continued to coordinate and exercise staff supervision over combat communications operations within the division. LTC Sorbet was aided by Maj S. J. Yuill, ADSO CPT S. H. Riben, Radio Officer and Lt S. Achilles wire officer.

During the period 1 Nov 1968 - 31 Jan 1969 communications support for combat operations continued throughout the 25th Infantry Division. Emphasis on the use of secure FM radio communications continued through this period. The division CRYPTO Logistic Support Section continued to expand their efforts in distribution and maintenance of the secure voice equipment. As roles and missions of the various divisional units were changed clearing the tactical operations, communications resources were allocated from division assets accordingly. Preceding and during the prisoner release talks near Tay Ninh, on 25 December and 1 January the ADSO coordinated the combat reaction force and control base communication installed and operated by divisional and non-divisional units at Tay Ninh.

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## 2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Increased Comradery Observations, Evaluation: and Recommendations.

- a. Personnel: None
- b. Operations: None
- c. Training: None
- d. Intelligence: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Organization: None

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25th INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCLG

SUBJECT: Operation Report of the ACoFS, G4 for Period Ending 31 January 1969

Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDCMH  
APO 96225

1. SECTION 1 - OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES.

a. (C) Chronology of Significant Events.

(1) Logistical support of the division was improved by the implementation of the through-put concept. Supplies, to include ammunition, were delivered directly from depot to DAU TIENG and FSB's adjacent to the MSR. A significant reduction in the use of air assets was realized by application of this principle.

(2) The type and number of Class V items regulated by ASR remained fairly stable. However, the allocation of several types of HE rounds was reduced. This fact, coupled with the heavy expenditure of artillery ammunition, necessitated requests for supplemental allocations during the last two months of the reporting period.

(3) In order to improve operational readiness rates, the division implemented "Project Dog". This program was devised by the 1st Logistical Command to identify "war weary equipment" requiring replacement or depot overhaul. Identification of equipment will be achieved through the use of retrograde criteria relative to mileage, hours of operation, etc. and supplemented by analysis of maintenance records.

(4) In November 1968, USARV established policies and procedures for construction of SEA huts. These buildings will be located at outlying areas not provided R&U support or under the cognizance of an Installation Engineer. The Division requested construction of ten of these structures within the TAOI.

(5) Representatives from Department of the Army Major Items Data Agency (MIDA) and USARPAC conducted a 100% semi-annual verification of the 25th Infantry Division's units Equipment Status Reports. This inspection was conducted 22 - 25 November 1968. A total of 10,332 reportable lines were inspected; only 418 lines were reported in error, representing a 4% error rate. This compared favorably to the overall USARPAC error rate of 18%.

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(6) Retrograde of salvage and CONEX containers received renewed emphasis during December 1968. Prior to 1 January 1969, the salvage yards at CU CHI and DAJ TIENG were cleared. During the same period, the Division Transportation office retrograded two hundred twenty-seven (227) CONEX containers. This attrition was in accord with Project "COLES", which tasks the division to reduce the container population from an on-hand figure of 2,105 (15 November 1968) to an operating level of 1,475 by June 1969.

(7) Intensive maintenance management of wheeled vehicles raised the operationally-ready rate from a low of 70% to a high of 90% on 31 January 1969. Ready rates for tanks and tracked vehicles averaged 90% during the reporting period.

(8) During the period 30 December 1968 - 2 January 1969, the USARV "STRIP" Team conducted a survey of excess items in the 725th Maintenance and 25th Supply Transportation Battalions. Headed by the chief of the Maintenance Division USARV G4, the team was composed of two officers and eight enlisted men. Disposition of excess will be in accordance with instructions furnished by USASUPCOM - Saigon.

### b. (U) Command

(1) The G4 office provides general staff supervision in the areas of supply maintenance, logistics readiness and base development construction.

(2) Organization. The office of the ACofS G4 is currently organized under para 06, TOE 7-4G. The section is authorized four officers and six enlisted men. These individuals are currently organized to supervise internal administration, supply, maintenance, logistics readiness, and base development. One additional officer is utilized to coordinate the base development of the three base camps. The warrant officer assigned (see (3) (b)) resulted from the appointment of the Senior Supply NCO.

### (3) Personalities

(a) ACofS G4. During the entire reporting period, the ACofS G4 has been Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Williams, 068778, GS (Armor).

(b) Staff. At the close of this reporting period, the assistant staff officers were:

Deputy G4. Major John E. Eshelman, 091936, GS (Infantry)  
(1 November 1968 - 14 January 1969)

Major John E. Blanck, 075504, GS (Artillery)  
(15 January 1969 - 31 January 1969)

Supply Officer. Major Carl F. Freeman, 076136, GS (Infantry)  
(1 November 1968 - 21 November 1968)

Major John E. Blanck, 077504, GS (Artillery)  
(22 November 1968 - 14 January 1969)

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Base Development Officer. Major Donald T. Hodgkinson, 05703413, GS (Infantry).

Maintenance Officer. Captain Robert L. Woodson, 05214670, GS (Ordnance Corps)  
Assistant Supply Officer. WO1 Rafael Miranda, W2219740 (Quartermaster Corps)

**C. (C) Logistics**

(1) Supply support is provided on an area basis by the 25th Supply & Transport Battalion located at Cu Chi. Support provided to organic elements only, and less medical, cryptographic, and EAM, Class III and IIIa. The same support is provided at Dau Tieng by forward support elements of the 25th S & T Battalion. At Tay Ninh, similar support is provided by the 277th Supply & Services Battalion, 29th General Support Group, Saigon Support Command.

(2) Medical support on an area basis is provided by the 25th Medical Battalion, whose companies operate the equivalent of post dispensaries or station hospitals at Cu Chi, Dau Tieng, and Tay Ninh. Additional medical support is provided by the 12th Evacuation Hospital at Cu Chi and the 45th Surgical Hospital (MUST) at Tay Ninh.

(3) Services. The division provides grave registration service at Cu Chi and Dau Tieng. Saigon Support Command provides quartermaster field laundries at Cu Chi and Tay Ninh.

**2. Section 2 - Lessons Learned: Commanders Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.**

- a. Personnel. None
- b. Operations. None
- c. Training. None
- d. Intelligence. None
- e. Logistics. None
- f. Other

**(1) Use of T-17 membrane for Helipads.**

(a) **OBSERVATION.** T-17 membrane, when torn, presents a safety hazard to helicopters.

(b) **EVALUATION.** Division engineers have constructed helipads at FSB's and base camps utilizing M8A1 matting. This matting is impervious to rotor wash and natural elements.

(c) **RECOMMENDATIONS.** That in consonance with supply and safety capabilities that helipads be constructed utilizing M8A1 matting.

**(2) 107mm Mortar Cartridge Container Extension.**



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(a) Observation. Units have been indiscriminately discarding the unexpended cartridge container extension used with the M328A1, M329A1, and M335A1 tail assemblies of the 107mm mortar round.

(b) Evaluation. This net enabled the enemy to employ these extensions as a component part of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

(c) Recommendation. All unexpended 107mm mortar cartridge container extensions be retrograded to ASP's.

THOMAS E. WILLIAMS  
LTC, GS  
ACofS, G4

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25th INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCA

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the ACofS, G5 For Quarterly Period Ending  
31 January 1969.

Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDCMH  
APO 96225

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Personnel:

(1) LTC Vincent I. Brosky remained the ACofS, G5 except for a brief period that required a temporary vacancy to be filled in the 2nd Brigade. He was assigned as Executive Officer of the 2nd Brigade from 12 November to 13 December, returning to his position as ACofS, G5 on the latter date. Major Dan H. McClendon was reassigned to CONUS on 23 December. His successor as Assistant G5 is Major Richard R. Ring who joined the division on 18 January from a CONUS assignment. LT Michael A. Kovner was assigned as PSYOP officer on November replacing CPT Audric A. Endrijonas who was assigned to the 2nd Brigade.

B. Revolutionary Development.

(1) Significant changes are taking place in the size and management of the Revolutionary Development Cadre teams in the TAOI. The cadre teams are being reduced in size from 59 to 30. These new smaller teams will come under the control of the village council instead of working directly from the Provincial Headquarters. The Cadre teams will be provided security by PF platoons stationed in the local areas. There are presently 33 cadre teams in the TAOI, an increase of 2 during the reporting period. There are 19 teams in TAY NINH Province, 10 in HAU NGHIA and 4 in PHU HOA District of BINH DUONG Province.

(2) The MACV Hamlet Evaluation system (HES) remains the principal means of measuring progress of pacification within the TAOI. A comparison of 31 October 1968, the previous reporting period, to 31 December 1968 is as follows:

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<u>Hamlet Category</u>	<u>Population</u>		<u>Percent</u>			
	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Dec</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Dec</u>		
A	0	0	0	0		
B	55	68	163,106	220,415	29.2	37.3
C	102	124	224,639	281,410	40.4	46.8
D	59	42	89,793	58,910	16.1	9.7
E	6	3	3,020	3,540	0.6	.6
VC	86	51	62,796	22,420	11.2	3.6
ABANDONED	74	118				
Non Hamlet			13,542	12,961	2.5	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>406</b>	<b>556,985</b>	<b>599,724</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

These figures represent a dramatic change in the security status of the population within the TAOL. During the three month period over 130,000 people have come under the security of the GVN. The number under VC control has been reduced by almost 50,000. The influence of the GVN is expanding into areas that have been under the domination of the VC 15 or more years.

Pacification efforts have yielded significant results at the sugarmill area of DUC HUE District (XT4706) where at the beginning of the campaign only 2 hamlets were under GVN security. As of 31 December 1968, there were eight hamlets under GVN control in this area.

CU CHI District in HAU NGHIA Province had 7 hamlets under GVN control on 31 December 1968.

(3) In TRI TAM District of BINH DUONG Province two traditional VC hamlets located along the SAIGON River were upgraded to contested status due to the combined efforts of the 3rd Brigade and the TRI TAM District Chief's effort to wrest the area away from the Viet Cong.

The HES Ratings of the 35 targets hamlets as of 31 Oct and 31 Dec are as follows:

	<u>31 Oct</u>				<u>31 Dec</u>			
	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>VC</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>VC</u>
TAY NINH		10			6	5	0	0
HAU NGHIA	1	10	3	8	13	9	0	0

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BINH DUONG		2			2	0	0	
TOTAL	1	22	3	8	21	14	0	0

**C. Civic Action**

(1) The most significant single factor of the civic action program has been the placing of one maneuver battalion in each district of the TAOI. The S5 of each Battalion acts as a liaison officer with the district. Civic action projects have as a result, been planned, coordinated and accomplished more effectively. The units have taken greater interest in Civic Action since they can identify themselves with a specific section of the country.

(2) MEDCAPS: The MEDCAP program has taken another forward surge with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. MEDCAPS have been conducted at least weekly in the 35 hamlets that have been targeted for pacification during the reporting period. During this reporting period there were 1035 MEDCAPS conducted with 93,000 patients being treated. This compares favorably to 678 MEDCAPS during the last quarter at which 74,000 patients were treated. Several significant MEDCAP projects took place during the reporting period.

a. A quick reaction was effected by the Division Surgeon in conjunction with the S5 of the 2nd Brigade and GVN officials from CU CHI District when it was determined that plague had broken out in TRUNG LAP village (XT5921) in early December. Over 4,000 people were inoculated and of those who contracted the dread disease only one died. The entire village area was sprayed by PA&E and the local villagers were informed of preventive measures to be taken by ground loudspeaker broadcasters and specially prepared leaflets.

b. In DUC HOA District, a combined MEDCAP program by the 25th Division and the 25th ARVN Division is presently being conducted to reduce the tuberculosis rate in the area. The U.S. personnel provide the X-Ray treatment and the ARVN medics conduct continuous treatment of those individuals found to have the disease.

(3) Construction. During the reporting period the primary efforts of the division have been directed toward the selected hamlets of the Accelerated Pacification campaign. Coordination of effort with GVN officials and MACV advisors indicated that public works projects such as improvement of roads into hamlets and the capping of wells to provide the people with adequate drinking water were necessary to improve the HES rating of the selected hamlets. Also needed as a part of the program were bulletin boards and T.V. stands in each hamlet to provide the people with adequate information about the goals of the GVN. A great deal of the construction effort of the division has been aimed at these areas. The 65th Engineer Battalion has opened roads in the TAOI that have been closed for several years to civilian traffic; among these are highways 6A, 7A, TLL, and an unmarked route from XT302249 - XT234306. The 554th and 588th Engineer Battalions have also built or repaired 6 Bridges in the TAOI, the most significant being a 140 foot class 60 Bailey Bridge across the VAM CO DONG at GO DAU H. (XT383250). The continuation of "Operation Band-Aid", the hasty repair of highways within the TAOI, has resulted in over

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160 kilometers of roads being graded and leveled this quarter. Over 700 construction projects were completed by the division during the reporting period, including over 500 homes of civilian families damaged as a result of VC activity. Twenty two schools were repaired or constructed, over 40 wells were capped or dug, 6 bridges were built, 8 market places were improved and 5 local dispensaries and 8 churches were repaired or renovated during the quarter.

(4) Distribution. Scrap lumber remains the primary commodity that is distributed to the people. More than 500,000 board feet of lumber was distributed during the reporting period. Also distributed were 700 sheets of tin roofing 120,000 lbs of cement and 200,000 pounds of foodstuffs.

### (5) Civic Action Imprest Fund:

Expenditures from the civic action imprest fund totaled 2,471,000 \$VN during the quarter. The previous quarter the division expended 685,000 \$VN through the fund. This large increase in expenditures was largely due to support of the Accelerated Pacification Campaign. PSYOP support of the campaign resulted in large number of Chieu Hoi and Support the GVN T-Shirts, balls and flags being purchased. Flagpoles and flags were erected in all the hamlets selected for upgrading.

### (D) Psychological Operation (PSYOP)

(1) PSYOP activities were in support of operations conducted in TAY NINH and HAU NGHIA Provinces and TRI TAM and PHU HOA Districts of BINH DUONG Province.

(2) A total of 71,240,000 leaflets were disseminated in the Division TAOI. This is an increase of 22,439,400 leaflets over the last reporting period. Ten leaflets were developed and printed by the ACofS, G5 while 21 leaflets were developed and produced by the 6th PSYOP Bn for the Division.

(3) During the reporting period, 818 hours of air and ground loudspeaker broadcasters were conducted. This represents a 235 hour increase over the last reporting period.

(4) The PSYOP effort against VC/NVA units remained at approximately the same level as the previous quarter. The increased PSYOP activity was directed toward civilian targets. A total of 94 Hoi Chanhs rallied to the GVN, a decrease of 87 Hoi Chanhs from the previous quarter. The decrease in the number of Hoi Chanhs can be attributed to a sharp drop in the number of contacts.

(5) During the period from November through January, Division PSYOP activities were conducted in support of Colors Up (accelerated Pacification Campaign). PSYOP was directed at the target hamlets and the population in general by saturating these areas with leaflets and aerial loudspeaker broadcasters. In addition to this, extensive PSYOP was conducted through face to face communication, hand dissemination of leaflets and other PSYOP material such as Chieu Hoi matches, PSYOP kits, kites, balls, and ground PSYOP loudspeaker broadcasters. PSYOP support of MEDCAP operations was performed through leaflets disseminated, loudspeaker broadcasts and distribution of many and varied PSYOP items.

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(6) Enemy activity during the reporting period was characterized by their avoidance of contact. The three major contacts, an attack on patrol Base Camp MOLE and two (2) attempted ambushes on the convoy outside the BEN CUI Rubber Plantation, all of which resulted in very heavy losses to the VC/NVA, were exploited by Division PSYOP.

(7) PSYOP activity was conducted in support of Voluntary Informant Program (VIP) through the extensive use of Reward for Information/Reward for weapons leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts. A noted increase in the amount of information from civilian sources was evident during the period.

(8) During the reporting period, emphasis was placed on getting US, ARVN VIS and APT Psychological Operations closely coordinated and involving the GVN PSYOP elements more actively in the total PSYOP program. This coordination was accomplished at battalion level by the establishment of permanent liaison between the battalion and district officials. Although considerable PSYOP effort was conducted by US units and district POLWAR personnel, the ideal situation has yet to be reached. The best method of conducting PSYOP is Face to Face communication which can only be accomplished effectively by the Vietnamese PSYOP effort. Additional emphasis must be placed on getting the various Vietnamese PSYOP agencies to take the initiative and conduct PSYOP on a Face to Face level.

### II Section 2, Lessons Learned:

#### A. Item: 500 watt loudspeaker mount for LOH OH-6

1. Observation: A 500 watt loudspeaker was developed for use in the OH-6, utilizing two 250 watt loudspeakers mounted in a saddle bag configuration.

2. Evaluation: This speaker system was found to work very well, making an aerial loudspeaker available at brigade level compatible with the air assets available to the brigade.

3. Recommendation: Continued use of this loudspeaker configuration.

#### B. Item: Early Word.

1. The Air Force has developed a system by which an individual using a tactical radio could broadcast a message to the loudspeaker aircraft which would patch its radio receiver into the loudspeaker and broadcast the message over the loudspeaker.

2. Evaluation: The system was used by the 25th Division and worked very well. The message is much clearer than if the individual was on board the ship. The system cuts out most background voice and feedback which is always a problem with live broadcasts from the aircraft.

3. Recommendation: This Early Word system should be utilized for live broadcasts whenever possible.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCAN

5 February 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Aviation Battalion for the Period  
ending 31 January 1969. RCS CSFOR-65.

Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

1. SECTION I Operations: Significant activities

a. The period ended with the battalion staff and commanders as follows:

BN CO - LTC Kenneth J. Burton  
BN XO - Major Rural E.E. Adams Jr.  
ADAC - Major Richard Teipel  
CO, A Co - Major Charles W. Addicott  
CO, B Co - Major Bert L. Rice  
CO, HHD - Captain Paul B. Maini  
S-1 - 1st Lt. Robert F. Heady  
S-2/S-3 - Captain Alberto C. Salazar  
S-4 - Captain Andre F. Blackmon  
Maintenance Officer - Major Frank W. Peterson  
Aviation Safety Officer - Captain Gerald Hicks  
Flight Surgeon - Captain James A. Pritchard  
FBO - CW-3 Warren J. Satre  
Motor Officer - WO-1 Donald L. Ingold

Tab H

AVDCAN

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 25th Aviation Battalion for the Period  
ending 31 January 1969. RCS CSFOE-65.

5 February 1969

The battalion maintained an average personnel strength of 405 for the quarter. The battalion received 23 replacement aviators during the Reporting Quarter, of these 16 were assigned directly from Flight School. Personnel of the battalion were awarded 1 Distinguished Service Cross, 4 Silver Stars, 21 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 1 Bronze Star for Valor, 32 Air Medals for Valor, 5 Army Commendation Medals for Valor, and 4 Purple Hearts.

b. During this quarter, the 25th Avn Bn continued to support the Division on Operation Toan Thang, Phase II. Increased operationally-ready rates have again this quarter enabled the battalion to enjoy its highest monthly flight hour output. During the month of January the battalion amassed a total of 3414 hours, which is the highest number on record since the unit arrived in the Republic of Vietnam in April of 1966. Normal daily aircraft requirements included, (eight) UH-1D/H for command and control, (one) for administrative courier, and (three) for general support. Other aircraft are committed at night for counter-mortar, firefly, flare drop and general support. In addition, the battalion furnished daily, an average of three UH-1A's for command and control and general support, two Light Fire Teams on 24-hour alert for contact and escort missions and two UH-1A aircraft for administrative courier, general support missions and maintenance parts runs. Special missions for the battalion consisted of chemical drops, psychological operations, personnel detector, defoliation, search and rescue, emergency resupply, emergency medical evacuation, smoke screening, and aerial delivery of mortars. Airmobile operations included ready-reaction force for convoy coverage, eagle flight operations with division maneuver elements and insertion and extraction of long range reconnaissance patrols. The majority of the airmobile operations were of the quick reaction type, frequently conducted during the hours of darkness. Other significant operational activities continue to be the conduct of a Helicopter Load Preparation School for the Division, defense of a sector of the Base Camp perimeter and experimentation and demonstration of the Mortar Aerial Delivery System (MADS).

SATISTICAL SUMMARY OF COMBAT PERFORMANCE DATA: (1 November - 31 January 1969)

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FLIGHT HOURS	3,169	3,261	3,414	9,844
SCORTIES	5,600	5,460	5,567	16,627
PASSENGERS CARRIED	8,860	6,110	9,017	26,037
CARGO HAULED (TONS)	126	102	97	325
ENEMY KILLED (3C)	8	17	18	43
ENEMY KILLED (POSS)	6	29	13	50
ENEMY STRUCTURES (DEST)	2	2	3	7
ENEMY STRUCTURES (DAM)	3	2	0	5



AVDCAF

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SUBJECT: Operation Report of 25th Aviation Battalion for the Period  
ending 31 January 1969. KCS CSFLK-65.

	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
ENEMY SAMPANS (DEST)	0	0	0	0
AIRCRAFT HITS	5	7	6	18

c. The battalion had (ONE) 1 accident, which was the result of a forced landing caused by engine failure. There were no incidents during the reporting period complementing the highest flying hour exposure in the past year. This record can be primarily attributed to command emphasis placed on establishing and maintaining a thorough and intensive accident prevention program.

2. SECTION II. LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS. EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. PERSONNEL: NONE

b. OPERATIONS:

(1) Control of UH-1 Door Gunners

(a) OBSERVATION: Recent experience on combat assaults has shown the need for a more effective method of controlling the suppressive fire provided by UH-1 door gunners.

(b) EVALUATION: Many potential accidents existed in this unit due to inexperienced door gunners, who in the turmoil of battle, became excited and swept their door guns beyond the so called "safe sector" and into the path of the other aircraft in the flight. To eliminate this potential hazard, this unit established procedures whereby each door gunner is given a designated sector of responsibility for providing suppressive fire in the formation. These sectors, established through the use of the clock system, provide traversing limits for each gun, without restricting the selection of targets by the gunner within his sector. In addition, all inboard guns in the formation are restricted from firing as an added safety measure. However, even though sectors of fire are assigned to each door gunner, aircraft commanders may direct them to fire outside their respective sectors, if the tactical situation dictates. Utilizing this system, it has been determined that all firing from the aircraft can be more effectively controlled without any loss in over-all efficiency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all aviators and door gunners be continually briefed on the assigned sectors of fire system, to include the reasoning behind it, the methods of control to be utilized, and the benefits that can be realized from its use.

c. TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION - NONE

d. INTELLIGENCE - NONE

e. LOGISTICS - NONE

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End actual OR